Until the bomb blasts at Eagle Square on October 1, 2010 and the
intensification of Boko Haram depredations, concerns about security
capability in our country were defined in terms of training and
equipment for personnel of the police, the State Security Service and
the military. The 50th independence anniversary bomb blast, however,
changed the paradigm. Since the challenge was novel, it created new
awareness and triggered some dimensions of response that required the
cooperation and collaboration of all the security agencies, the military
and paramilitary institutions.
However, while the urgency for inter-agency synergy came to the fore,
such sudden imperative only helped to expose years of rivalry between
and among these agencies. It also brought to fore the abysmal lack of
capacity to deal with this new threat. Therefore, it came as no surprise
that in the aftermath of the tragedy, the police and the SSS appeared
to have worked at cross purposes in the immediate investigations and
arrest of suspects. Unfortunately, up till today, that remains the
situation
While the police considered the October 1, 2010 bombing an
infringement on public order and therefore its prime responsibility, the
SSS saw it as a national security issue involving the disruption of a
celebration presided over by the president and attended by senior
government officials and visiting heads of government.
This jurisdictional fog has engendered a lack of cooperation and
limited information sharing incentives between these important security
agencies such that almost every criminal investigation is now bogged
down by petty squabbles as we saw in the Radio House blast fiasco for
which both the Police and the SSS have different theories as to the
motive of the suspect. It is also this petty rivalry that has led to a
situation in which both the Police and the SSS are holding different
sets of suspects in the homicide investigation into the death of Comrade
Olaitan Oyerinde, the former Principal Secretary to the Edo State
governor even when it is obvious that two separate killer squads with
different objectives could not have murdered one person on the same date
and at the same time.
To be sure, rivalry between security agencies is not peculiar to
Nigeria. In fact, to understand how dysfunctional interagency
coordination could be even in developed societies, I strongly recommend
the March 2009 essay titled “America’s Broken Interagency” by Thomas A.
Schweich who was U.S. Ambassador for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform
in Afghanistan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and Chief of Staff of the U.S.
mission to the United Nations. He painted a rather interesting
perspective of interagency failings in Europe, Afghanistan and the US
based on first-hand experience.
What is, however, peculiar to our nation is a situation where senior
officials of these critical agencies constitutionally responsible for
protecting us would not only openly trade blames and damaging
accusations but would indeed seek to discredit one another in the media
in a bid to score cheap advantage. And because of the danger this
portends for our national security, there is need for an urgent
intervention at the level of political leadership.
Whether we want to admit it or not, it is the failure of the security
and crime detection agencies which accounts for why the military that
should channel its energy and resources towards protecting our
territorial integrity as a nation has had to deploy troops in 34 of the
36 states of our country today. (I understand only Ekiti and Jigawa
states do not as yet have one form of any standing quasi-military
operations). While I am aware that most ordinary Nigerians have more
faith in our armed forces whenever they are in situations of distress,
there is also a case of familiarity breeding contempt. That, I guess, is
what is happening on the streets of Maiduguri today. The larger
implication of this exposure is that it makes the military troops so
deployed for these duties rather vulnerable, especially on the roads. It
is therefore time to strengthen the police to perform their
constitutionally assigned role.
Chief of Army Staff, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, when I
received a “martial order” to present this paper with the theme
“Enhancing Inter-Agency Cooperation In Conflict Management: The Nigerian
Perspective”, my initial feeling was that it looks like I have been
cornered by a constituency that brooks little impertinence, to punch
above my weight. The audience, the timing and the theme suggested
something of a challenge to my intellectual pretensions and to the pen
which is often touted, albeit rather glibly, to be mightier than the
AK-47. But then life is full of challenges and I can only express my
appreciation to the Chief of Army Staff, Lt General Azubuike Ihejirika
as well as to the men and officers of the Nigerian Army for inviting me
here today.
But it is important for me to underscore the fact that I am not an
authority on security or military issues. I make that confession knowing
that I am speaking to one of the most intellectual gathering that can
ever be assembled in this country given how much investment the Nigerian
Army has made on the education of its men and officers, especially
within the last two decades. With many officers holding several degrees,
including at doctoral level, I am conscious of the fact that there are
many people within this audience who are more knowledgeable than me,
especially on the issue we are engaging today. I therefore make this
intervention not as an expert but rather as a citizen and a public
affairs observer, who believes that in an era when criminals are
becoming more sophisticated in their craft, there is an urgent need for
our security agencies as well as the armed forces to also up their game.
Indeed, given what transpired yesterday (last Sunday) at St Andrews
Military Protestant Church, Jaji, there couldn’t have been a more
appropriate time than this to engage this issue which impacts on the
peace and prosperity of our nation and the institutional capacity of our
armed forces, especially the Nigerian Army. We are in a period when the
nation is facing a new form of security challenge that involves the
planting of Improvised Explosive Devices on neighbourhood roads; the use
of rocket launchers and other high grade weapons by armed gangs to
attack police stations, military posts, financial institutions and even
markets.
We are at a period when vehicles, rigged with deadly explosives, are
rammed into media houses, television viewing centers and places of
worship, killing many Nigerians with scores of others maimed for life,
physically and psychologically–a period when indoctrinated young men
strap explosives on their bodies to blow themselves up in gatherings of
men, women and innocent children just to pursue the destructive
objective of an extremist group.
Today, our nation is faced with a situation almost akin to war, where
dusk to dawn curfew had been in place in some northern states for more
than a year, and where the task of maintaining internal security, peace
and order, is now being carried out by the military with troops and
armoured vehicles patrolling the streets of major cities across the
country. In times such as this, it is the level of cooperation or
collaboration among these agencies that determines the degree of
security of lives and property in our nation, or indeed in any nation
for that matter.
Security wise, our country is today very challenged and the
manifestations of the threat include the Niger Delta conundrum; the
violent encounters between farmers and pastoralists across the country;
the intermittent eruptions over religion as well as the perennial
settler-indigene sectarian violence. But the issue that is of greater
concern to us today is the global wave of belief-based violence and that
is why I have tailored my paper to attempt addressing the challenge of
inter-agency coordination in an age of terrorism.
Interestingly, while inter-agency collaboration may be a recent
development globally, it is an area where Nigeria has had some
rudimentary experience in the last two decades. Even when restoration of
law and order may be the core mandate of the police, because they have
proved to be lacking in the requisite capacity to perform this function
effectively in our country, the federal government has had to resort to a
loose arrangement called JTF which unfortunately is fast becoming a
permanent feature of our national life with all the attendant
implications. What this entails is that with soldiers leading the
charge, personnel from other armed forces and security outfits are
usually drafted in to complement their efforts in dealing with conflict
situations.
But given that each agency has its culture, operating procedures,
budget, career progression, mission and rules, it stands to reason that
there would be challenges with regard to cooperation and coordination.
Unfortunately, these are issues on which we have not paid sufficient
attention and now they are coming to haunt us.
Globally, security experts and political scientists have long been
concerned about the tension between institutional fragmentation and
policy coordination in and among security agencies of many countries.
Cut to the bone, this situation translates essentially to the challenges
of inter-agency co-ordination. To be blunt, much of this challenge
stems from inter-agency non-cooperation. Related literature is therefore
rife with examples of agencies competing with each other or asserting
their independence, while cooperation is relatively rare. This
dissonance usually comes to the fore during major crisis. It goes
without saying that in environments of fragile peace such as ours, the
interlinked nature of security and development is inescapable, with
security necessary to enable socio-political progress.
Yet the pace at which the campaign of violence and deaths has spread
across some states in the North has exposed the gap in the relationship
among the various agencies. Events in the past months have shown that
there is an urgent need to fix that gap. The absence of effective
interagency cooperation has not only led to the death of hundreds of
civilians in the hands of armed bandits, it has also claimed lives of
scores of military, intelligence, immigration, customs, police and
prisons service personnel. This shows that it is not only in the
interest of the nation that an enhanced interagency cooperation is
needed, but also in the interest of each of these agencies and their
operatives.
It is, however, comforting to note that the men and officers seated
here today are on the same page with me so I am merely preaching to the
already converted. In September last year, the former General Officer
Commanding 82 Division of the Nigerian Army, Major General Sunday Idoko,
stressed in Port Harcourt the need for inter-agency cooperation amongst
military and para-military groups. According to Idoko, inter-agency
cooperation was very essential because the threat to the nation’s
environment demanded such of all agencies – from planning to the
execution of assignments. Major General Idoko could not have been more
apt.
From the NIA, which monitors issues of national security from outside
the shores of Nigeria; the SSS which is saddled with gathering
intelligence internally; the military which is tasked with protecting
the territorial integrity of our nation and assisting in maintaining
internal peace when needed; the police tasked with the responsibility of
detection and prevention of crime; the Customs charged with preventing
the flow of contraband, illegal arms and ammunition across our border
posts; the immigration whose responsibility it is to ensure that
suspected terrorists do not cross into our territory; the prisons
mandated to ensure that detained suspects do not escape and convicted
terrorists serve their terms; the FRSC that quickly indentify unmarked
vehicles which may have been rigged with explosives; to the civil
defence corps whose operatives quickly pass information to the
appropriate agencies when unusual things are noticed around the country,
the importance of enhancing interagency cooperation cannot be
overemphasized.
But one thing must be clear: Interagency cooperation is a matter of
mutual trust and mutual respect – having a hunch that if I give my word,
you will have my back. That seems to be lacking substantially in our
country today. Let’s look at two instances. When the Nigerian army
carried out an operation that led to the arrest of the late Boko Haram
leader, Mr Muhammed Yusuf, he was handed over to the police in
Maiduguri, apparently for further investigation and prosecution. But
shortly after, we all know what happened to Yusuf. His killing became a
focus of both local and international media with the military forced to
come out severally to deny having a hand in his death. Such development
erodes the kind of mutual trust that is needed to enhance interagency
cooperation. What is needed is that assurance that when I play my role,
you won’t mess up your part.
While I concede that we are in an uncharted territory with regards to
dealing with home-grown terrorism, that also makes it compelling that
there be more collaboration and coordination. To do that, we need to
rethink old ways of fighting insecurity as they are not effective. But
even when collaboration should be a given, the pertinent questions
remain: collaborating on what? What is our level of expertise on
terrorism; that capacity to fight an enemy that is not seen and that is
ready to die and bring others down? And how do we fight terrorism
without alienating the communities and without abusing human rights? The
last point might seem a small issue, but it affects the capacity for
effectiveness in this kind of war where you need the support of the
people to succeed.
Because fighting terrorism requires intervention across multiple
agencies, effective interagency coordination is not only desirable, it
is essential to meeting timelines as well as reducing wasteful overlap
and unnecessary duplication. But such efforts could only be enhanced by
acknowledging the role played by the various units in achieving a common
goal. Giving credit to all the agencies involved in the execution of a
given task, no matter how little the contribution, could indeed go a
long way in enhancing cooperation among them. The main challenge today
is that the office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) which sits
atop the security infrastructure is somehow challenged to perform this
critical role.
Yet interagency coordination can only be effective in an environment
where each agency’s responsibilities are clarified; modalities for the
sharing of information are provided and the operational guidelines that
would ensure the realisation of the stated objectives are clearly
defined. Because differences in institutional perspectives and
individual assumptions can muddle a clear understanding of the
challenge, a common sense of ownership and commitment is needed and that
can only be a product of an institutional arrangement which is still
sorely lacking in our country.
As I end this short presentation, I believe it is imperative for us
to begin to pay attention to some of the foregoing issues as we seek to
find a way around factors militating against enhanced interagency
cooperation in Nigeria at this crucial period of our national life. How
we do this will determine how secured all of us would be now and in
future. We must recognize that in the face of new dimensions of human
conflict, new models of crisis engagement and management are coming into
play. Different geographical and sociological peculiarities shape
response plans. But most importantly, inter-agency cooperation
undergirds the containment strategies. Nigeria cannot, and should not,
be the exception.
In the knowledge age that we are in today, novel thinking must drive
new tactics of resolving conflict while a comprehensive review of the
nation’s inter-agency cooperation template needs to be embarked upon.
Because it is a necessary precondition for the survival of the Nigerian
state.